Abstract-We consider an infrastructure consisting of a network of systems each composed of discrete components that can be reinforced at a certain cost to guard against attacks. The network provides the vital connectivity between systems, and hence plays a critical, asymmetric role in the infrastructure operations. We characterize the system-level correlations using the aggregate failure correlation function that specifies the infrastructure failure probability given the failure of an individual system or network. The survival probabilities of systems and network satisfy first-order differential conditions that capture the component-level correlations. We formulate the problem of ensuring the infrastructure survival as a game between an attacker and a provider, using the sum-form and product-form utility functions, each composed of a survival probability term and a cost term. We derive Nash Equilibrium conditions which provide expressions for individual system survival probabilities, and also the expected capacity specified by the total number of operational components. These expressions differ only in a single term for the sum-form and product-form utilities, despite their significant differences. We apply these results to simplified models of distributed cloud computing infrastructures.
be reinforced at a certain cost to withstand such attacks. Nonreinforced components can be disabled by attacks at a cost to the attacker. Additionally, effects of component attacks may propagate to other components within S i , and furthermore, they may propagate to components of other systems S j , j = i. For example, consider a cloud computing infrastructure with multiple sites, each housing several servers. A server may be brought down by a cyber attack, but a single physical attack on the network fiber to the site may disconnect all servers at the site. In general, correlations between components and systems lead to the propagation of disruptions within and beyond the individual systems, respectively. In an extreme case, effects of attacks may propagate across the network to all other systems, and possibly degrade the entire infrastructure.
The infrastructure provider is tasked with strategically reinforcing the components against attacks by taking into account various system-level and component-level correlations. Let n i denote the number of components of S i , and y i and x i be the number of components of S i attacked and reinforced, respectively. A reinforced component survives a direct attack but may be disrupted indirectly, for example, an operational server being disconnected due to an attack on network fiber. Let P i be the survival probability of S i , and P I be the survival probability of entire infrastructure. Also, let S −i denote the infrastructure without S i , and P −i be its survival probability.
The aggregate failure correlation function C i is the failure probability of "rest" of the infrastructure S −i (namely, without S i ) given the failure of S i . Intuitively, it indicates the relative importance of S i by capturing the disruption propagation from S i to entire infrastructure. We consider an important special case of an asymmetric network such that: (a) C N +1 = 1 indicating that the network failure will disrupt the entire infrastructure, and (b) C i = 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N indicating that disruptions of individual systems are uncorrelated. In addition to system-level correlations, the interdependencies between components of individual systems are captured by simple first-order differential conditions on P i which generalize the contest success functions and statistical independence conditions of component failures [21] . This two-level characterization helps to conceptualize the basic correlations in infrastructures such as cloud computing and smart grid infrastructures [24] . In addition, it leads to a simplified analysis by "separating" the system-and component-level aspects, and also provides insights into the needed defense strategies.
We formulate a game between the attacker and provider wherein the costs of attacks and reinforcements of systems, given by L A (y 1 , . . . , y N +1 ) and L D (x 1 , . . . , x N +1 ), respectively, are not known to the other. The provider maximizes the sum-form utility function given by
where g D represents the benefit of keeping the infrastructure operational. We also consider the product-form utility function given by
which will be minimized by the provider. It represents the "wasted" cost to the provider since it is the expected cost under the condition that the infrastructure has failed. The attacker's utility functions are similarly defined. We are interested in the expected capacity of the infrastructure expressed in terms of the expected number of available components, given by
which reflects the average size of part of the infrastructure that survives attacks.
In previous work, the sum-form utility function [21] and the product-form utility function [22] have been considered separately for a generic version of this game. They represent two different ways of representing the value of keeping the infrastructure operational: the sum-form represents a weaker coupling of probability and cost terms, whereas the productform utility function is their product. In general they lead to qualitatively different defense strategies that are derived separately, and the expressions for the survival probabilities appear to be structurally different. In this paper, we show that under the asymmetric correlations, the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this game [9] leads to expressions for P i 's and N I with the same structure. We derive NE conditions that show the dependence of P i on cost terms, and their partial derivatives and aggregate correlation functions. The estimates of P i for sum-form and product-form utilities have the same expression in Theorem 4.1 except for one term, given by ξ
To consider the case where the sum-form and the product-form utilities are equivalent, we equate the two terms and obtain the following "equivalent" gain term of the sum-form
which is an increasing function in both P I and C D . Or, equivalently we have,
This similarity is striking since the sum-form and product-form utilities represent two quite different objectives.
We apply these results to a simplified model of cloud computing infrastructure with multiple server sites connected over a network. We derive expressions for P i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N, and N I for both sum-form and product-form utilities. Even under simple uniform independent distributions of component attacks and reinforcements, they reveal useful and also complex underlying relationships.
Our results extend previous results on interconnected systems in [11] , [12] and cyber-physical infrastructures in [23] , [24] by considering more general systems and correlations. Our results specialize results in [21] , [22] by explicitly considering the communications network, and also unify their results which are derived separately for sum-form and product-form utilities.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We briefly describe related work in Section II. In Section III, we describe the infrastructure model along with the aggregate correlation function and differential conditions on system survival probabilities. We present a game-theoretic formulation in Section IV, and derive NE conditions and estimates for system survival probabilities and the expected capacity. We apply the analytical results to a model of cloud computing infrastructure in Section V. We present conclusions in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Critical infrastructures of power grids, cloud computing, and transportation systems provide vital public and private services [8] , [15] . They depend on complex communications networks that connect the constituent systems, which by themselves consist of many disparate cyber and physical components [15] . The communications network plays a very critical role in these infrastructures [6] , in some ways more so than the constituent systems, and its failure can significantly degrade the entire infrastructure [3] , [25] . These infrastructures are under increasing cyber and physical attacks, which the providers are required to counter by applying defense measures and strategies.
By capturing the interactions between providers and attackers of these infrastructures, game-theoretic methods have been extensively applied to develop the needed defense strategies [1] , [4] , [16] , which attempt to ensure continued infrastructure operations in presence of evolving threats [26] . Partial differential equations and discrete components models have been used in several of these infrastructures to model the physical and cyber systems [2] in formulating the underlying games. The game-theoretic formulations and the solutions developed for such infrastructures are quite varied and extensive. They include: multiple-period games that address multiple time-scales of system dynamics [14] ; incomplete information games that account for partial knowledge about the system dynamics and attack models [18] ; and multiple-target games that account for possibly competing objectives [27] .
A comprehensive review of the defense and attack models in various game-theoretic formulations has been presented in [13] . Recent interest in cyber and cyber-physical systems led to the application of game theory to a variety of cyber security scenarios [16] , [28] , and, in particular, for securing cyber-physical networks [5] with applications to power grids [6] , [10] , [17] , [19] .
The system availability, reliability and robustness aspects can be explicitly integrated into the game formulations [1] for infrastructures such as power grids, cloud computing and transportation systems. In particular, discrete models of cyberphysical infrastructures have been studied in various forms under Stackelberg game formulations [7] . A subclass of these models using the number of cyber and physical components that are attacked and reinforced as the main variables have been studied in [24] . These models characterize infrastructures with a large number of components, and are coarser compared to the models that consider the attacks and reinforcements of individual cyber and physical components. Various forms of correlation functions [21] , [22] , [24] are used in these works to capture the dependencies between the survival probabilities of constituent systems, such as the cyber and physical subinfrastructures.
Complex interacting collections of systems have been studied using game-theoretic formulations in [12] , and their twolevel correlations have been studied using the sum-form utility functions in [21] and the product-form disutility functions in [22] . The sum-form utility represents a gain-centric priority, wherein an independent gain term weighted by P I represents the gain to be maximized by the provider. The product-form disutility, on the other hand, represents a cost-centric priority, wherein the expected cost is to be minimized. The sum-form utility function [21] and the product-form utility function [22] are considered separately for a generic version of this game wherein all systems play a similar role, unlike the asymmetric role of the network considered here. In terms of analysis, these two formulations have a certain degree of commonality but there are also differences; in particular, estimates of P I can be obtained somewhat directly for the productform as shown in [22] . These two utility functions also lead to qualitatively different defense strategies, and in particular P I appears explicitly in the sensitivity estimates of system survival probabilities in product-form but not in sum-form. In this paper, we show that under the asymmetric correlations, these results can be unified so that they have the same form and differ only in ξ + i and ξ × i . Additionally, we derive expressions for the expected capacity of the infrastructure that also differ only in these two terms.
III. DISCRETE SYSTEM MODELS
We consider infrastructures wherein the constituent systems consists of discrete components. We capture the underlying correlations at the system-level using aggregate correlation functions as well as those within each system using differential conditions.
A. Aggregate Correlations
We capture the interactions between systems and also between systems and network of the infrastructure in terms of their survival probabilities using the aggregate correlation functions in the following definition.
Condition 3.1: Aggregate Correlation Function: [21] , [22] The probability that infrastructure is operational is given by
where C i and C −i are the aggregate correlation functions of S i and S −i , respectively, such that
The aggregate failure correlation function captures the interdependence of rest of the system S −i on the failure of S i , which can be illustrated using the following special cases.
(a) Asymmetric Network: In a cloud computing infrastructure consider that the fiber connections to N sites, each with l servers, constitute the network system S F = S N +1 . Then, we have
where K is a normalization constant, since the fiber failure rate is amplified by l in rendering the servers unavailable. Thus, we have
The system failures satisfy a statistical independent condition given by C i = 1 − P −i , indicating that the failure probability of S −i is not dependent on P i . This condition in turn leads to P I = P i P −i , which indicates the statistical independence of the survival processes of S i and S −i . More generally, if C i > 1 − P −i , the failures in S −i are positively correlated to failures in S i , that is, they occur with a higher probability following the latter. If we denote the failure probability of S i by Pī, then we have P −i|ī > P −i , or equivalently failure in S i leads to a higher probability of failure in
(c) Definite Failure: In another case, when the failure of S i leads to a definite failure of rest of the infrastructure, we have C i (P i ) = 1 such that P I = P −i . This condition indicates that the infrastructure survival probability solely depends on the marginal failure probability of S −i .
(d) OR Systems:
The OR systems as modeled in [24] correspond to the special case N = 2 where the infrastructure consists of cyber and physical systems (denoted by i = C and −i = P , respectively) that can be independently analyzed. For OR systems, the failure probability of cyber or physical sub-infrastructure is Pī ∪−i = Pī + P −i or equivalently Pī ∩−i = 0. Thus, we have P I = P i +P −i −1 and C i = 0. This condition indicates that the failure processes of S i and S −i are uncorrelated. We generalize this condition next in Condition 3.2 for N systems considered in this paper. We now consider an important special case where network plays a strong asymmetric role in that its failure disconnects all systems S i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N. Furthermore, these systems are suitably shielded so that their failures are uncorrelated in that they do not escalate to the infrastructure level. We capture such scenarios using the following condition. The part (i) of this condition implies that P I = P −(N +1) , thereby indicating the role of rest of the infrastructure S −(N +1) without the network. The part (ii) of this condition implies P I = P i + P −i − 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , N which separates failures of the constituent systems from rest of the infrastructure S −i .
We further consider that the effects of reinforcements and attacks can be separated at the system level such that 
for the provider.
In the cases C i is constant, we note that ∂Ci ∂xi = 0, which is the case under both parts of Condition 3.2.
The conditions in this section correspond to system-level correlations, and are not fine enough to capture the componentlevel correlations. In the next section, we consider generic differential conditions that characterize component-level correlations.
B. System Survival Probabilities
We consider that the system survival probabilities satisfy the following differential condition, which was originally defined for cyber and physical sub-infrastructures [21] , [23] .
Condition 3.4: System Multiplier Functions: The survival probabilities P i and P −i of system S i and S −i , respectively, satisfy the following conditions: there exist system multiplier functions Λ i and Λ −i such that
The derivative in the above condition is linear in P i for Λ i = 1, and is faster than linear if Λ i > 1 and slower than linear if Λ i < 1. This somewhat abstract condition is satisfied in two special cases studied in literature.
1) Statistically Independent Components:
The special case when component survival probabilities are statistically independent with and without reinforcements has been studied in [23] . Let p i|R and p i|N denote the conditional survival probability of a component of S i with and without reinforcement, respectively. Under the statistical independence condition of component failures, the probability that S i with n i components survives the attacks is
as in [23] , or equivalently
By differentiating with respect to x i we obtain
The condition for faster than linear derivative is ln i|N , where e is the base of natural logarithm. The condition that the survival probability of a reinforce component is higher than that of non-reinforced component but less than ep i|N , namely, ep i|N > p i|R > p i|N , corresponds to only slower than linear derivative.
2) Contest Survival Functions:
The contest survival functions are to express P i in [12] such that P i = ξ+xi ξ+xi+yi for a suitably selected slack variable ξ, which in turn leads to
The condition for slower than linear derivative is
which is satisfied for larger values of x i sufficient to make the left hand side negative.
IV. GAME THEORETIC FORMULATION
The provider's objective is to make the infrastructure resilient by reinforcing x i components of S i by optimizing the corresponding utility function, namely, minimizing the sumform or maximizing the product-form. Similarly, the attacker's objective is to disrupt the infrastructure by attacking y i components of S i by optimizing the corresponding utility function. NE conditions are derived by equating the corresponding derivatives of the utility functions to zero, which yields the following for sum-and product-form utilities, respectively:
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N + 1 for the provider.
A. NE Sensitivity Functions
We now derive estimates for P i at NE using partial derivatives of the cost and failure correlation functions to infer qualitative information about their sensitivities to different parameters.
Theorem 4.1: Under Conditions 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4, estimates of the survival probability of system S i , for i = 1, 2, . . . , N +1 is given byP
where A = + and A = × correspond to sum-form and product-form, respectively, such that 1, 2, . . . , N + 1 under the condition: C i < 1 or ∂Ci ∂xi = 0. Under the asymmetric network correlation coefficient C N +1 = 1, the survival probability of the network is given by
for A = +, ×. Proof: Our proof is based on deriving NE conditions separately for sum-form and product-form utility functions, and then comparing them to identify their common structure and the difference terms. At NE, for sum-form we have
Then, using the equation in Condition 3.3 and ∂Pi ∂xi = Λ i P i from Condition 3.4, we have
Under the condition C i < 1 or
, and hence, we obtain
Similarly, for product-form we have
Then, we have
Consider the survival probability of the infrastructure, under the asymmetric network condition, we have C N +1 = 1 and
= 0, which imply the condition C i < 1 or ∂Ci ∂xi = 0 is not satisfied; hence, the above formula cannot be used directly since the denominator
Then, NE condition for the sum-form is given by
Similarly, for the product-form we obtain,
which completes the proof. The estimatesP i;D above provide sensitivity information about the corresponding survival probabilities with respect to various parameters (the estimates may not necessarily lie within [0,1]). In particular, they qualitatively relate P i to the corresponding aggregate correlation function C i and its derivative, and also to Λ i . These dependencies are identical for both sum-form and product-form utility functions. Indeed, the difference between the two formulae is captured by the single term ξ We now consider that the network failure renders entire infrastructure unavailable, and those of individual systems are uncorrelated with others given by Condition 3.2. The following theorem provides a single, simplified expression for the expected capacity under these conditions. Theorem 4.2: Asymmetric Network Correlations: Under Conditions 3.1-3.4, the expected capacity is given by
where A = + and A = × correspond to sum-form and product-form, respectively, such that
Proof: Equations (1) and (2) 
indicates that higher gain g D leads to lower number of operational components. For the product form,
indicates that higher survival probability of the network leads to lower number of operational components. The dependence on Λ i is similar in both cases, namely, faster than linear leads to lower number of available component, and vice versa. The dependence on C D is somewhat different due its presence in the denominator for product-form, even though ∂C D ∂xi appears in the numerator in both forms.
V. DISTRIBUTED CLOUD COMPUTING INFRASTRUCTURE
A distributed cloud computing infrastructure consisting of N sites, each with l i servers at site i, i = 1, 2, . . . , N has been studied in [20] by using separate cyber and physical models for each site. The sites are connected over a communication network S N +1 as shown in Figure 1 . The network consists of a number of routers each of which manages l N +1 connections as shown in Figure 2 .
This infrastructure is subject to a variety of cyber and physical attacks on its components. Cyber attacks on the servers may be launched remotely over the network since they are accessible to users. Meanwhile, routers are located at geographically separated sites and access to them is limited (to network administrators), and they are not as easily accessible over the network. Cyber attacks on routers require different techniques and represent different costs to the attacker compared to server attacks. Furthermore, this infrastructure is subject to physical attacks in the form of fiber cuts, which require a proximity access by the attacker. In particular, the network fibers that connect server sites to routers may be physically cut, and disconnect the entire site making it inaccessible to the users. And, such attacks may also be launched on the network fibers between routers at different locations on the network.
The infrastructure provider may employ a number of reinforcements to protect against attacks, including replicating the servers and routers to support fail-over operations, and installing physically separated redundant fiber lines to the sites and between router locations. These measures could require significant costs, and hence must be strategically chosen.
A. System-Level Correlations
The cyber and physical aspects of a site S i can be represented by using S (i,c) and S (i,p) that correspond to cyber and physical model, respectively. Similarly, those of the network S N +1 are represented by S (N +1,c) and S (N +1,p) , which are the cyber and physical models as illustrated in Figure 3 . The relationships between these system-level models can be captured using the the aggregate correlation functions as follows (as described in [21] , [20] ). For the communications network, we have
which reflects that a cyber attack on a router will disrupt all its l N +1 connections, thereby illustrating the amplification effect of cyber attacks. For the server sites, we have a similar effect due to physical fiber attacks reflected by
which indicates that at site S i the fiber disruption will disconnect all its l i servers.
B. Component-Level Correlations
We now consider a special case where the attacker and provider choose the components to attack and reinforce, respectively, according to uniform distribution. Let n (i,c) and n (i,p) represent the number of cyber and physical components, respectively, of site S i such that n i = n (i,c) +n (i,p) . Similarly, let x (i,c) and x (i,p) represent the number of cyber and physical components reinforced at site S i such that If a cyber component (i.e., a server) is reinforced, it will survive a cyber attack but can be brought down indirectly by a fiber attack. Then, the probability that a cyber-reinforced component survives y (i,p) fiber attacks is approximated by
where the normalization constant f (i,c) is appropriately chosen.
On the other hand, if a cyber component is not reinforced, it can be brought down by either a direct cyber attack, or indirectly through a fiber attack. Thus, we approximate the survival probability of a cyber component at site k as
which reflects the additional lowering of the survival probability in inverse proportion to the level of cyber attack y (i,c) . Using these formulae, for cyber model S (i,c) of site S i , we have, under the independence of component attacks
It is interesting to note that it does not depend on the cyber reinforcements term x (i,c) even though it corresponds to
. It, however, depends on the physical reinforcement term x (i,p) .
Under the statistical independence of cyber and physical attacks, we have the following generalization of the condition derived in Section III-B1
Then, by noting that ∂xi ∂x (i,c) = 1, we obtain
which enables us to approximate Λ i by Λ (i,c) . ConsiderP somewhat counter-intuitive at the surface but note that it only characterizes the states that satisfy NE conditions, and in particular, it illustrates the richness of infrastructure behavior at NE.
C. Expected Capacity
In terms of the expected capacity N A I , the dependence on y (i,c) and y (i,p) − x (i,p) + is more direct, and qualitatively similar for both sum-form and product-form, since the term Λ i appears in the denominator. Based on Theorem 4.2 we obtain the following expressions: for the sum-form,
and for the product form,
In both cases, the multipliers n i , g D and C D are positive, and it is reasonable to assume the condition ∂C D ∂xi ≥ 0, since the reinforcement cost does not decrease with x i . Thus, the expected capacity decreases with y (i,c) and the opposite is true with respect to y (i,p) − x (i,p) + . In both cases, the dependence on the number of servers l i at site i is qualitatively similar in that the expected capacity increases proportional to its logarithm.
In summary, the overall dependencies considered here are quite simple, namely, under the statistical independence and uniform distributions of components chosen by both defender and attacker. Even under such simple conditions, the detailed NE conditions are quite complex to characterize.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We consider a class of infrastructures with multiple systems, each with discrete cyber and physical components. These systems are connected over a communications network which plays an important asymmetric role by providing the critical connectivity that makes these systems available, and consequently requires an explicit consideration in ensuring the performance of the infrastructure. Individual components of a system can be disrupted directly or indirectly by either a cyber or physical attack. The components are reinforced against such attacks by explicitly taking into account the correlations between the systems and also between the components within individual systems. We characterize the system-level correlations using the aggregate failure correlation function that specifies the infrastructure failure probability given the failure of an individual system or network. The survival probabilities of systems and network satisfy first-order differential conditions that capture the component-level correlations.
We formulated the problem of ensuring the infrastructure survival as a game between an attacker and a provider, using two different utility functions, namely, the sum-form and product-form; the former is the sum of a survival probability term and a cost term, and the latter is their product. We derived Nash Equilibrium conditions in terms of the partial derivatives of cost terms and failure correlation functions. In particular, we derive expressions for individual system survival probabilities, and also the expected capacity specified by the total number of operational components. These expressions differ only in a single term for the sum-form and product-form utilities, despite their significant differences in modeling objectives. We applied this approach to simplified models of cloud computing infrastructures.
These results extend or specialize previous results on interconnected systems [11] , [12] and cyber-physical infrastructures [23] by using the general utility functions. They also unify the results that were separately developed for the sumform utility functions in [21] and the product-form disutility functions in [22] for the cases wherein the network plays a critical, asymmetric role.
Several extensions of the formulation studied in this paper can be pursued in future studies, including cases where the effects of attacks and reinforcements of specific individual components are explicitly accounted for. It is of future interest to compare this formulation to one where the utility function contains the expected capacity term in place of infrastructure survival probability. Another future direction is to consider the simultaneous cyber and physical attacks on multiple components. It would be interesting to study sequential game formulations of this problem, and cases where different levels of knowledge are available to each party. Applications of our approach to more detailed models of cloud computing infrastructure, smart energy grid infrastructures and highperformance computing complexes would be of future interest. It would also be of future interest to explore the applicability of this overall method to continuous models such as partial differential equations describing individual systems or the entire infrastructure.
